We specify a new model of homeowner mortgage default. In our model, homeowners do not know the current price of their home until they sell; rather, they maintain an unbiased guess of the price and optimally update this guess as new information, such as the sale price of similar homes, is observed. Compared to the predictions of a model where homeowners know the current price with certainty, uncertainty about the price considerably reduces the probability homeowners default even when the current price is likely substantially less than the mortgage balance. We estimate model parameters using data on self-assessed house prices, house-price indexes and mortgage defaults. We find uncertainty about the current level of house prices reduced defaults for a cohort of prime mortgages issued in 2006 by 25 percent in 2010 and 2011. * We thank Carlos Garriga, Albert Marcet, Norm Miller and seminar participants at a number of conferences and institutions for comments and suggestions.
Introduction
One of the many ways in which housing is different from most financial assets is that the sale price of any house is not precisely known known until a sale occurs, and the range of possible sale prices is quite large. There may be many reasons for this phenomenon, but two come to mind immediately. The sale of a home is subject to sometimes important search and matching frictions, implying under the right circumstances an ex-post distribution of sales prices for ex-ante identical homes.
1 In addition, no two homes are exactly identical, since at a minimum each home occupies a different location. Homeowners and appraisers can observe sales prices of nearby similar homes ("comps"), but differences in location and other attributes suggest these comps provide imperfect signals for the current sales price of any other home.
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Our goal in this paper is to explore how homeowner uncertainty about the current sales price of their homes affects default decisions. To this end, we study the implications of an optimal model of default in which homeowners never observe the current value of their home unless they sell. We abstract from search frictions and assume homeowners do not know the exact price of their house because no otherwise identical housing has sold nearby. In each period of the model the unobserved sales price of the house is subject to random shocks;
and, homeowners observe a noisy but unbiased signal of the sales price of their house (based on nearby "comps," if you like). Homeowners in our model maintain a guess of the mean and variance of the current sales price of their home and optimally update this guess using a Kalman Filter. Every period, homeowners decide whether to stay in their house or sell, and if homewoners sell and the resulting sales price is less than the pre-determined mortgage balance the sale results in a default. Our model can be viewed as an extension of a classic 1 For example, Piazzesi, Schneider, and Stroebel (2014) estimate a search and matching model in which buyer heterogeneity leads to a distribution of prices. See Han and Strange (2014) for a review of the search literature as applied to housing.
2 According to their detailed analysis of pricing characteristics of 59 metropolitan areas, Malpezzi, Ozanne, and Thibodeau (1980) find hedonic regressions of house prices on housing attributes typically yield R 2 values in the range of 0.5 to 0.75. Variation in house prices after controlling for observed characteristics is still a prominent feature of house price data, even with more localized data on sales prices. The web site Zillow, for example, lists confidence intervals for its ability to predict the sales price of any home given the sales price of nearby homes. These intervals can be large: See the table under the heading "Data Coverage and Zestimate Accuracy," at the web site http: //www.zillow.com/zestimate/#what. model of optimal default such as Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) , modified to accommodate the case in which decision makers, in this case homeowners, are uncertain as to the current value of the equity.
We believe the model environment we describe is not controversial, since anyone that owns a house knows they cannot state the current sales price with certainty. Thus, we use the model to answer a quantitative question: By how much did this uncertainty raise or lower default rates during the housing bust? To answer this question, we perform a "countefactual experiment." That is, we estimate the parameters of our model; at the estimated parameters, we simulate default rates given the current sales price of housing is uncertain; and then re-simulate default rates after assuming the sales price of housing is perfectly known, but holding all other parameters unchanged. We estimate default rates would have been 25 percent higher in 2010 and 2011 for the mortgages in our sample if homeowners were able to perfectly always observe the current sale price.
We estimate the parameters of our model using two different panel data sets covering the experiences of 20 metropolitan areas from the 2005-2011. Our first data set merges data on house price indexes with data on self-assessed house prices by homeowners. We use this data set to estimate the variance of shocks to house prices and the noisiness of house price signals homeowners observe. These variances identify the "Kalman Gain," which measures the rate at which homeowners incorporate new signals when they update their guess of the sales price of their house. In addition, they determine homeowners' self-assessed variance of the current sales price of the home. The model predictions fit the data closely and a compelling case can be made that homeowners Kalman Filter the avaiable sales data. We estimate a steady state Kalman Gain of about 0.55 and derive that homeowners would report a 95 percent confidence of ± 8-1/4 percent around the sale price of their homes.
Our second data set covers the same geography and time period, and merges self-assessed house price data with the experiences of a large number of prime mortgages issued in 2006 with 20 percent equity at origination. These data pin down parameters specific to our default model: The value of the outside option after defaulting, any costs of default, and the variance of a periodic shock that affects the net benefit of remaining in the current home.
3
The model does not exactly fit observed patterns of default rates, for explainable reasons.
The model does not have unemployment as an explicit "factor" for defaults, and it cannot fit the surge in defaults that occur in 2009 accompanying the onset of the Great Recession:
See Gerardi, Herkenhoff, Ohanian, and Willen (2014) and Schelkle (2014) , for a discussion of unemployment and default. 4 In addition, the model cannot fit some of the default rates observed in 2007 and 2008 as the sales prices of most houses in our sample should have been greater than the par value of mortgages, even after accounting for uncertainty about the sales price. 5 The model, however, can fit the size and variation of default rates after in 2010
and 2011: A regression of predicted default rates on actual default rates for likely "underwater" mortgages (i.e. mortgages with a remaining balance greater than house value) yields an intercept of zero, a coefficient of 0.992 and an R 2 of 0.41.
As mentioned earlier, we use the model to ask what default rates would have been in 2010 and 2011 if homeowners had a more precise guess about the sales price of their home. In this counterfactual experiment, we simulate our model under the assumption that homeowners know the sales price of their house with certainty, but keep all other parameters unchanged.
In the experiment, default rates rise by 25 percent, from 6 percent on average across our 20 metropolitan areas to 7.5 percent. Default rates increase for two reasons. First, when people sell in the counterfactual experiment they know with certainty if their house is worth less than their mortgage, and this eliminates a few occurrences when people expect to default and receive a positive equity "surprise." More importantly, uncertainty about the current value of the home adds option value to not selling the home. In most models of default, remaining in the home has option value because the future value of the house may rise. In our model, this option value is larger; since current home values are not precisely known,
high future values are more likely to occur.
3 As is common in discrete choice models, this shock is included to ensure the model always predicts nonzero probabilities over choices.
4 It has been suggested to us that we allow the mean and variance of taste shocks to be a function of local unemployment rates. This would indirectly introduce the effects of unemployemnt into the model.
5 This is suggestive to us that many homes in our sample of Freddie-Mac securitized loans had less than 20% equity at origination in 2006, despite what lenders recorded. Piskorski, Seru, and Witkin (2013) present evidence suggesting 7% of all mortgages in private-label RMBS pools had a second lien when the borrower represented no such lien was present.
Our paper contributes to three distinct literatures. A new and growing literature has emerged on the accuracy of homeowner perceptions of home value, and how potential biases in the perception of home value affects decisions: Schneider (2009) and Ehrlich (2014) discuss how perceptions affect prices in search and matching models and Corradin, Fillat, and Vergara-Alert (2014) study how uncertainty about current home value affects optimal portfolio decisions.
6 Our research is also related to the observation that appraisals tend to be backwards looking and smoother than transactions prices: See Geltner (1991) and references therein. Our results imply that this so-called "appraisal bias" results from optimal filtering of noisy sales data.
Finally, our paper builds on the traditional contingent-claims approach to characterize optimal default decisions when the value of the underlying asset is subject to stochastic shocks. In the specific context of mortgage contracts, option-based models such as Kau, Keenan, and Kim (1994) and Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) predict that borrowers should default when the value of staying in the home falls below the value of keeping the mortgage current, where the latter value incorporates the fact that house prices or financing conditions could improve in the future. Our model adds two novel considerations to the standard framework. First, waiting to default has additional value for our borrowers because beliefs that current house prices are low can be caused by a sequence of low signals even when the true value of the home has not changed. For this reason, when home prices are uncertain homeowners that believe they are under water attach a higher probability to the possibility that they will have positive equity in the future as compared to a model where house prices are known with certainty. This pushes the default threshold towards more negative equity and causes households to default less often than they would if current home prices were perfectly observed. Second, homeowners in our model experience random utility shocks from living in their home each period; therefore, when they sell their home or default 6 Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2014) study house price dynamics when agents with different house price perceptions interact and Adam, Kuang, and Marcet (2012) study how agent beliefs over house prices can delink house prices from fundamentals and cause a house price boom in response low interest rates. Also relevant are papers that ask if homeowners maintain unbiased estimates about the value of their house: See Follain and Malpezzi (1981) and Kiel and Zabel (1999) . Bucks and Pence (2008) , Kuzmenko and Timmins (2011) and Genesove and Han (2013) are recent papers in this literature in which the authors check the accuracy of homeowner assessments by comparing the growth rate of self-assessed home prices to the growth rates of commonly available house price indexes, related to what we do.
on their mortgage they forego the possibility of high realizations of this shock in the future.
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Since our main objective is to study the effect of uncertainty about current house values on defaults, we lay out a model that highlights the option aspects of default decisions. As is well known, models in this class predict -counterfactually -that household characteristics such as current wealth and income have no bearing on default decisions. Minor variations on these models suffice to overturn that prediction, however. Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2009) , for instance, propose a model where borrowing and lending rates differ so that the present value of keeping one's home depends on income profiles. In the same spirit, Corbae and Quintin (2014) and Campbell and Cocco (2014) show that borrowing constraints tie the decision to default to current wealth and income in addition to home equity. In this paper, our goal is to document the quantitative importance of uncertainty about current house value on the decision to default, and this, we show, can be done without introducing market frictions. and declining (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) house prices. Many details are in the appendix, but in short, the CSW indexes and the self-reports cover roughly the same geography and set of homes in each of the 20 MSAs we study. We formally analyze these data later in the paper. In this section, we describe patterns in the data that appear to be consistent with homeowner uncertainty. 7 The basic message that uncertainty about the current value of the underlying asset matters for default decisions applies naturally to housing as we explain in this paper but likely also applies to corporate finance. For instance, our framework can be used to argue that improving accounting standards may cause an increase in the propensity of corporations to default on their debt. However, the CSW indexes and the self-reported data do not move in lock-step throughout the sample, the focus of this paper. Figure 1 Figure 1 shows that after the peak, the CSW price index declines more sharply than the self-reports. In many MSAs, the difference in the percentage decline of the CSW index and the self reports is quite large. Table 2 reports the percentage decline in the average self-report data and the CSW indexes, measured from the MSA-specific peak date of the CSW to 2011. At the median MSA, the CSW declines by 14 percentage points more than the self-reports. In the extreme case of the San Francisco MSA, the CSW index declines by 44 percent whereas the self-reports only declines by 19 percent.
It is not obvious from Figure 1 and Table 2 , but the magnitude of the difference between the CSW and self-reported values is strongly correlated with the change in the CSW index. This is true for the boom period, the year 2000 to the CSW peak date, as well as the bust period. The top panel of figure 2 shows results from the boom period. For each MSA, cumulative real growth in the CSW index, the x-axis, is plotted against cumulative real growth in the self-reports. Figure 2 shows that growth in the CSW and self-reports are highly correlated but growth in self-reports does not reflect growth in the CSW index on a percent-for-percent basis. Rather, when cumulative growth in the self-reported data over this period is regressed on cumulative growth in the CSW index, the coefficient is 0.74 with a standard error of 0.04 and the intercept is 15.9 with a standard error of 3.0.
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The bottom panel of figure 2 shows results from the bust period, the CSW peak date through 2011. As with the boom period, cumulative growth of the two series are highly correlated, but they do not move percent-for-percent. A regression of cumulative growth in the self-reported data over this period on cumulative growth in the CSW index yields a coefficient of 0.86 with a standard error of 0.09; an intercept of 9.4 with a standard error of 3.5; and a R2 value of 0.85. During the bust period, the regression estimates are sensitive to the ending year of the sample. When the sample is specified to end in 2009, the same regression yields a coefficient of 0.58 with a standard error of 0.08 and an R2 of 0.74; with an end date of 2010, the coefficient is 0.74 with a standard error of 0.08 and an R2 of 0.82. We view the increase in the coefficient from 0.58 when the sample ends in 2009 to 0.86 when the sample ends in 2011 as additional evidence supporting our model -homeowners continually revise down their appraised home value with each passing year the CSW remains depressed.
In sum, during both the boom period and bust period, although the CSW and self-report data are highly correlated, the averaged self-report data do not increase or decrease percentfor-percent with changes to the CSW indexes. We show that these results are consistent with an environment in which homeowners receive noisy signals (such as the CSW) about the value of their home and optimally filter these signals when determining their home's current value. We consider the implications of this result in a model of optimal homeowner default, detailed next.
Default Model
We consider the behavior of an infinitely-lived mortgage-holder with linear preferences and geometric discount rate β ∈ (0, 1). For simplicity we assume that the mortgage is an interest-only console so that the mortgage balance, which we denote by d > 0, is constant over time. We assume the mortgagee knows that she does not know the exact value of her 9 The R2 of the regression is 0.95.
home if it were to sell in the current period, the focus of this paper. The mortgagee's priors about the price of her home in period t are log-normally distributed with unbiased mean h bt and dispersion σ bt -where the subscript b stands for"beliefs." The economic environment we describe below is consistent with this as an optimally formed prior distribution.
We assume that the unobserved log of the sales price of the home, denoted h * t , follows an AR(1) process with autoregressive parameter ρ ≤ 1 and innovation e t at date t. In the event ρ < 1, as a convenient normalization we assume that the process has zero long-term mean:
(1)
When we say "unobserved," we mean that the homeowner does not know h * t when she decides whether or not to sell her home; however, if the homeowner decides to sell, h * t is revealed. Obviously, we do not know if equation (1) is a reasonable characterization of beliefs about house prices during the housing boom and bust, which is the primary focus of our study.
The data suggest ρ is close to 1.
Each period, the owner observes a noisy but unbiased signal h st of the log of the true price that satisfies :
The subscript s refers to "signal." The shock processes e t and ν t are orthogonal to one another, independent across time and normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviations σ e and σ ν , respectively.
The homeowner understands that her current log house price is, from her perspective, a random variable with a mean and a variance. Given the processes for true house prices and what the homeowner observes, the homeowner optimally updates her guess of the mean and variance of her current log house price using a Kalman Filter, implying the log-normality of the distribution of current log house prices is maintained over time. Standard arguments show that the mean and variance are updated with a simple algorithm involving the Kalman gain discussed later. We assume the homeowner has held her mortgage for a few periods already, implying for given values of ρ, σ e and σ ν that the Kalman gain has essentially converged to its steady-state value; we discuss this later as well.
Given the Kalman gain has converged, the homeowner's estimate of the variance of log true house prices is fixed; call this variance σ 2 b . Given last period's mean for log house prices, which we call her "beliefs," and the signal in the current period, the homeowner optimally updates her beliefs according to the formula
where κ is the converged value of the Kalman gain. Equation (3) shows that optimally held beliefs in the current period are a weighted average of beliefs held last period, adjusted for the rate at which house prices mean-revert, and the signal observed at the start of the current period. While this looks like appraisal smoothing (Geltner, 1991) , it is also consistent with the optimal updating of beliefs given noisy signals of truth.
The household can sell ("terminate") her house in any period. The value of this decision given beliefs h b and fixed debt amount d is given by:
where E is the standard expectation operator and V o is the value of the best outside option after a sale which, for simplicity, we take to be a parameter in this exercise. Note that we have suppressed time subscripts for convenience since our environment is stationary. This formulation embodies key assumptions. First, the homeowner has the option to default on her mortgage, meaning that she can put the house back to the lender as full remediation for the loan. The total cost of defaulting is the parameter c ≥ 0; c captures the net present value of all utility and financial costs associated with default. Second, selling carries no transaction costs although nothing of importance would change if we introduced them in the problem.
Finally and more subtly, we assume that the sale decision is made prior to discovering the true market value of the home and that this decision is irreversible. 10 Given this formulation, we model a default as a sale with negative equity, exp {h * } < d. Of course, a homeowner who sells with beliefs that she is under water, i.e. exp {h bt } < d does so expecting to default, but she may also be positively surprised since the sale price is not known. Although h bt is represents the homeowner's best guess as to the log of the current home value, the homeowner understands that it is a guess; she knows the the standard deviation of possible home price realizations given this guess. The expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of possible home prices.
Instead of selling, the homeowner can choose to remain in her home for at least one more period. We denote the net period utility she receives from living in the home period t by ǫ t and model it as a draw from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σ ǫ . We assume that the net draw of ǫ is independent of the mortgage balance and i.i.d across time. Whether and how the owner's mortgage balance should affect serice flows net of user cost -which ǫ is meant to capture -depends on the difference between borrowing costs and the return on the funds she can invest outside of the home. Here we simply assume that the net benefit of staying in the home is indepedent of the level of d. 11 Homeowners choose whether or no to sell after observing ǫ t . The value of staying, then, conditional on a net-benefits realization ǫ, beliefs h b and a debt level d is:
where W is the value of being in the home given prior beliefs at the start of the next period before the value of the taste shock is realized.
While homeowners do not know precisely what their priors will be next period, they understand all processes involved in the updating of that object. In performing our value function iteration, we compute the expectation over future values of W involved in functional 10 Allowing for the possibility that a homeowner can put her house on the market with the (costly) option to not sell if she does not like the observed price would complicate the analysis but would not alter the basic economics of the model.
11 When we estimate the model, we include only data with loan-to-value ratios at origination of 80%. In this sense, the assumption of independence of d with ǫ should not be a problem in estimation as d is essentially fixed in our data.
equation (5) by, first, taking many draws from the homeowner's prior, second and for each of these draws, drawing a signal from the distribution implied by this assumed realization of truth given expected mean-reversion in one period and, finally, averaging over the resulting realizations of W.
This, of course, presumes that the function W is known. In the algorithm we employ, the expected value of W is computed recursively as follows. Given a candidate for W , equation (5) makes it obvious that the optimal selling rule given h b and d is characterized by a threshold ǫ * (h b , d) above which the homeowner chooses to stay in the home for an additional period. Recursively then,
Given this functional equation, the algorithm we employ in our computations is standard:
1. Compute V T , using (4); 2. Starting from the guess that W = V T (a natural starting point since it would be exactly correct under the assumption that agents have after a fixed number of period), iterate on (5) and (6) 
Estimation
Our estimation of the parameters of the model proceeds in two parts. First, we use the CSW and self-report data to estimate the parameters in the model related to homeowner uncertainty of the current level of home prices. Then, given these parameters, we use panel data from Freddie Mac on mortgage originations and defaults to estimate the remaining parameters of the model, those related to the decision to sell the home or continue in it. At each step, we highlight assumptions we make to map the data to the model.
Estimation of Uncertainty Parameters
We start with the process for true but unobserved log real house prices for a homeowner i in period t in a given metro area. We assume the true log price of the home, denoted h * it , follows a first-order autoregressive process with autoregressive parameter ρ and shock e it .
Unlike the default model, we allow the process to have a non-zero mean that can vary across 12 Imagine a game where the player draws a random variable ǫ from a mean-0 distribution, but has the option of ending the game after every draw with a 0 payoff. The value of staying in the game is V = max[e + βEV, 0], rewritten as V = max[e, −βEV ] + βEV . The only solution is EV > 0, which means the player should stay in the game with some negative draws, and thus the termination probability is less than 50 percent. To see this, suppose that EV = 0. This implies V = max[e, 0] which is greater than 0, a contradiction. Then suppose βEV < 0. Then V is always greater than 0, a contradiction.
h * it is not directly observable but homeowner i observes a noisy signal of the true log price, denoted h sit
We assume e it and v it are independently Normally distributed with mean 0 and variances σ 2 e and σ 2 ν . e it and ν it are independent of each other, and independently drawn over time, but for the time being we allow e it and e jt to be correlated and ν it and ν jt to be correlated for any two homeowners i and j in the same metro area at the same time.
Denote homeowner i's self-assessed value of her house as of date t − 1 as h bit−1 . Given the model structure and assumptions, homeowner i optimally updates her assessment of the value of her home in period t using a Kalman Filter,
κ it is the Kalman gain which is updated each period using the following recursion (Hamilton, 1994 )
For any 0 < ρ ≤ 1, κ it , V p it and V it converge monotonically to fixed values. The steady state value
is the standard deviation of the homeowners prior for the decision model of the previous section. V is the standard deviation around the current state after the current signal has been revealed.
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Importantly, we assume that κ it has converged to its steady-state value κ for each homeowner in our sample. We evaluate the plausibility of this assumption later. Given this, equation (9) can be written as
Since (10) holds for any homeowner i, it holds for the average of all homeowners i = 1, . . . , N.
Denote the cross-sectional average of a variable in a given metro area at time t using a capital letter and a subscript m, for example
h bit for all the i = 1, . . . , N homeowners in metro area m. After taking averages and substituting notation, equation (10) can be written as an expression in MSA-level cross-sectional averages
We do not directly observe the cross-sectional average signal, H smt , but instead observe the log of the CSW index. We assume the log CSW, denoted H mt , is an unbiased estimate of the average signal H smt up to an metro-specific additive scale factor α m and Normally distributed error u mt
Insert (12) into (11) to get
where
13 V p is the standard deviation around the current state before the current signal has been revealed. It is equal to V/ (1 − κ).
It is useful to rearrange (13) as
Denote the standard deviation of the measurement error on the signal as σ u . We estimate all 23 parameters κ, ρ, σ u and a m for each of the m = 1, . . . , 20 metro areas using simulated full information maximum likelihood over our sample period. Being slightly formal, denote θ as the vector of parameters and ℓ (θ) mt as the log likelihood of the data for metro area m at year t. This log likelihood is the log of the density of u mt from equation (15). Our estimate of θ maximizes
where N is the total number of simulation draws andl denotes a simulated log likelihood.
Equation (16) We subtract our estimate ofH m / (1 − ρ) from data such that goodness of fit abstracts from across-MSA differences in the average level of self-reported values. The R 2 of the pictured regression line of the self-report data on predicted values is 0.97 and the intercept of the regression is nearly exactly zero. The point estimate of the slope coefficient is 0.96 with a standard error of 0.014, implying that the actual self-reports vary a bit less than the outof-sample predictions when the CSW is considered to be the true signal, measured without error.
As a final step, we estimate the variance parameters σ 2 ν and σ 2 e . Additional assumptions on the nature of the correlation of shocks across households in an MSA are required to estimate these parameters. To make progress, we assume that homeowners in each metro area experience identical values of e and ν -that is, e imt = e jmt and ν imt = ν jmt for all homeowners i and j in metro area m in period t -but allow values of e and ν to vary across metro areas. The assumption that all agents in a given MSA receive the same sized shocks is not innocuous; in fact, one of us has written a paper documenting that the magnitude of house price declines during the housing bust varied quite a bit within some metro areas. On the other hand, a representative agent in each MSA is often assumed in models of Urban Economics.
Given this assumption, it can be shown that
Additionally, it is possible to show that once the Kalman gain converges to its steady-state value it satisfies
Although equation (18) is quadratic in κ, it is linear in σ 2 ν and σ 2 e . Given estimates of ρ, κ, and var H smt − ρH smt−1 −H m , equations (17) and (18) 
and the expression for σ 2 e naturally following from (17) and (18).
We estimate var H smt − ρH smt−1 −H m using data across all metro areas and years (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) 16 to be 0.008. At our estimated values for ρ and κ, and given the computed values of H smt andH in each period and metro area, we compute σ ν = 0.0556 and σ e = 0.0464, shown in rows 4 and 5 of table 3. The interpretation of these findings is that the standard deviation of shocks to home prices is 4.64 percent per year; and homeowners understand the standard deviation of the gap between the signal they receive on the value of their home and the true value of their home is about 5-1/2 percent. These estimates imply a value of √ V, the standard deviation of homeowners' uncertainty about the the value of their home, of 4.14 percent. In other words, we estimate that homeowners have a two standard error confidence interval around the current guess of their house price of ±8.28 percent. One view of our research is that we determine the importance of this confidence interval on optimal default decisions.
Given estimates of σ 2 ν and σ 2 e , we can compute the sequence of optimal Kalman gains for a homeowner starting the year she knows her true log house price with certainty.
17 In year 1, the Kalman gain is 0.410; year 2 it is 0.524; year 3 it is 0.548; in year 4 it is 0.552 percent;
and so forth. The convergence of the Kalman gain to near its steady state value by year 1 or 2 supports the assumption that the Kalman gain has converged for the homeowners in the sample.
In conclusion, by comparing the average of homeowner self-reports with Case-ShillerWeiss house price indices, and imposing that the Kalman gain has converged for everyone in our sample and that the shocks and measurement error hitting house prices and the signal are common to all people in a given metro area, we estimate ρ = 0.992, κ = 0.554, σ ν = 0.0556
and σ e = 0.0464. Additionally, we uncover the mean of true but unobserved house prices in each MSA,H m / (1 − ρ). In table 4 we report values of H bmt −H m / (1 − ρ) for each metro area in our sample. These values are appropriate for our default model in which we have assumed that the average value of the log true house price process is zero.
Estimation of Default Parameters
In this section, we take as given the parameters estimated in the previous section, set the annual discount factor β = 0.95, and use data on the default rates of mortgages to determine the remaining parameters of the model: The net present value of the utilty and financial cost of default c, the value of the outside option in the event of a sale or default V o , and the standard deviation of taste shocks, σ ǫ .
The data we use on on mortgage defaults are from Freddie Mac and are publicly available on the web. 18 The Freddie Mac data track the history of each mortgage purchased by Freddie
Mac from an originator, and cover the experiences of the mortgage from origination to either default or payment in full from prepayment. The data set keeps track of mortgages and not borrowers. We cannot link mortgages originated to the same buyer at two different times, as would occur if a homeowner were to sell one house and purchase a different one. We use the experiences of mortgages in each of our 20 MSAs, all of which we restrict to be issued in one of the 1st three quarters of 2006. We analyze mortgages with combined loan-tovalue (CLTV) at origination of 80%. We keep only 30-year mortgages backing single-family owner-occupied properties with debt-to-income ratio recorded at origination.
We track the performance of the mortgages originated in 2006 from 2007-2011. We focus on mortgages originated in 2006 because that was the year house prices peaked, minimizing the possibility households refinance an existing mortgage in later years in order to extract equity. The mortgages in the Freddie Mac data are tracked monthly; we aggregate the monthly data to annual. There are two complications to the mortgage data. First, many people miss a mortgage payment or two, but ultimately do not default on their loan. We ignore spells of missed payments that are quickly cured. We define the specific date of a default as the initial month of a spell of continuously missed months of payments that ultimately leads to a recording in the final month of the data set for the mortgage of "short sale", "deed-in-lieu of foreclosure," "REO acquisition," or "180 days delinquent," the longest duration of deliquency recorded. We define annual default rates in each MSA as the total 18 See http://www.freddiemac.com/news/finance/sf loanlevel dataset.html number of defaults during the year -that is, the total number of defaults where each spell of continuously missed payments ending in default begins during the calendar year -divided by the total number of loans in the sample as of January of that year. This computation assumes that households that refinance their mortgage (and thus exit the sample of mortgages with a termination code of "Prepaid or Matured") do not immediately default on their new mortgage. Table 5 shows unconditional statistics from these data by year. Columns (1) and (2) show the average and standard deviation of the sample size and columns (3) and (4) table 4 we use the model to compute the probability of a sale in each year. Conditional on a sale, we use the homewoners' subjective probability distribution over home values in each year, h bmt and σ b , to compute the probability the sale price exp {h * mt } is less than d, constituting a default. The model-predicted probability of default in a given year is the probability of a sale times the probability the sale price is less than the mortgage balance in that year, all conditional on h bmt and d.
Speaking precisley, we use maximum likelihood to estimate model parameters. One wrinkle is that exits can occur from our data for one of two reasons, default or prepayment.
We treat a prepayment as a censored spell. (1 − φ t ) φ 2 Prepay 210 ln
Sample End 672 ln
More formally, denote D τ as the number of people that default during year τ and E τ as the number that exit (prepay) during year τ . τ = 1 and t = 1 correspond to the year 2007, as before. The log likelihood of the sample from MSA m is
where each term in the square brackets is defined to equal 1 when τ = 1. The log likelihood of the entire sample is the sum of (20), summed across all 20 MSAs, i.e.
The main benefit to using maximum likelihood to estimate model parameters is that it appropriately weighs experiences of each MSA and year by observation counts. This is important in our sample, since as we show in table 5, sample sizes vary widely across MSAs and sample sizes in each MSA fall over time due to prepayments and default.
After we fix β = 0.95, shown in row 6 of table 3, rows 7-9 of that table report our maximum likelihood parameter estimates. 19 We find c = V o = 0, implying we could have rewritten the model in terms of one parameter, the standard deviation of taste shocks.
Column 5 
2008.
21 Thus, in most MSAs, in expectation households had positive equity and should have been very unlikely to default.
22
The bottom panel of Figure 1with the lower LTV ratios observed in the data.
The impact of uncertainty on defaults
We now estimate the importance of uncertainty on default rates. Holding all other parameters fixed, we set σ ν = 0, thus turning off the signal noise entirely, and recompute model predictions. In this experiment, owners have full certainty about their home value, and expect their assessments to be less volatile in the future since they won't be subject to noise. 1940-1949 through 1990-1999; 2000-2004; and 2005-2011 . We compute sampling weights for each bin prior to discarding any missing or imputed observations on house prices. The sum of the sampling weights across bins is 1.0 in each metro area in every year.
We calculate the average value of housing as the sampling weight for each bin multiplied by the average of the non-missing house values in that bin. We then adjust for inflation using the NIPA price index described earlier. We compute the average value of the log of real house prices using an analogous procedure. Table 7 shows the percentage of the sample (after accounting for sampling weights) with a top-coded observation for house value. We do not adjust any top-coded responses.
26 Bins are chosen such that each bin in every metro area in every year contains at least one house price observation. 
